Abstract: This paper argues that technical change in the East Asian countries was sector-specific, took the form of learning-by-doing and was induced by relative factor prices. Usual growth accounting exercises do not account for this in the structure of the assumed aggregate production function and therefore miss these technical gains. Assumed or estimated elasticities of substitution are too high in these studies. Calculations of elasticities using factor prices are more consistent with localized technical gains in Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. I find evidence that the technical change may have been induced by policy and macroeconomic shocks affecting relative factor prices. Plant-level TFP growth calculations using the Korean Industrial Census further support the hypothesis offered here.
Introduction
The influential papers of Young (1992 Young ( , 1994 Young ( , 1995 , Kim and Lau (1994) , Collins and Bosworth (1996) found that the high rates of output growth in the East Asian countries were due almost entirely to high rates of physical and human capital accumulation. These findings are paradoxical in the light of our observations that these countries continually produced new goods for the competitive world market and the intuition that industry-specific technical gains was what allowed this to happen. Much of the criticism of the "accumulation" findings has centered on the quality of the national accounts data. Adjustments and recalculations of total factor productivity growth found a more important contribution from technological change.
1 However, these accumulation findings have been too repeatable to dismiss solely on the basis of measurement issues. Thus the debate seems to go on interminably.
In this paper, we offer an alternative explanation behind East Asia's miraculous transformation, namely, successive technical gains in new more capital-intensive industries. The rapid structural change underlying this process is not accounted for in the one-sector studies that attribute growth mostly to factor accumulation. The issue of structural change in the East Asian countries had been raised before by Van and Wan (1997) and Nelson and Pack (1999) and conceptually, the general problem of observational equivalence between aggregated and disaggregated production structures had long been recognized by Diamond, McFadden, and Rodriguez (1978) . The main contribution of this paper is to introduce a way to distinguish between the production structure underlying our explanation and the structure implicit in the studies that find accumulation driving growth.
Using available factor prices, we can calculate the empirical elasticities of substitution and compare to the elasticities implied by the two models. We find that these empirical elasticity calculations support the story of sector-specific technical gains. Our theory also yields a testable implication for the relationship between factor price ratios and the ratio of implied marginal products (or the marginal rate of technical substitution). Comparing these two ratios, we find further evidence to support the sector-specific technical change hypothesis. In this exercise, we also identify periods that coincide with explicit government industrial targeting policies or macroeconomic shocks that affected factor prices to induce production in the more capital intensive industries. Sectoral TFPG calculations for Korea provide further evidence for the presence of technical gains.
Our theory hinges on the rapid structural change that is a salient feature in the East Asian countries' industrialization patterns. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the textiles and apparel industry dominated Korea's manufacturing economy, accounting for one-fourth to one-third of manufacturing value-added (Enos and Park (1988) ). In the late 1970's, textiles and apparel were replaced by the metals industry, which in turn made way for motor vehicles and parts in the mid-to-late 1980s which was followed in turn by the emergence of the semiconductor industry in the early 1990s.
Korea and Singapore experienced very rapid change in the composition of its exports to the U.S. (see Table 1 ); Taiwan was not far behind. Since exports to the U.S. made up a significant fraction of manufacturing output in these countries, this is an indication that structural change in manufacturing was also rapid. One possible interpretation of this pattern of development is that technological progress was made in these economies but was specific to certain sectors at different points in time. It is also possible that these gains were induced by a deliberate effort directed at certain key industries in different periods. Industrial targeting was a commonly-known policy on the part of the governments in the East Asian countries. Stern, Kim, Perkins, and Yoo (1995, pp. 184-6 ) described how Korea picked "winners" from 1973 proceeding industry by industry, "
[going] to great length to attempt to discern whether Korea had the technical skill needed ... or could expect to acquire these skills quick enough."
Almost without exception, the new industries successively introduced were of higher and higher capital intensity. Assuming one structure for the production function may identify the economy's growth as mostly due to capital deepening and little due to technological change. An alternative dynamic structure where the more capital intensive industry experiences technological change in each period would fit the observations equally well. In the experience of the East Asian countries, this technological progress may have been due to learning-by-doing, where the "doing" was possible because of a deliberate targeting policy or because of macroeconomic factors that affected factor prices in such a way as to induce production and learning.
The study of Kim and Lau (1994) found a clearly different pattern in TFP growth between the East Asian (accumulation) and G-7 (innovation) countries.
They suggest that this is possibly due to the two groups of countries being in different stages of development. The evidence here is consistent with that hypothesis where the relevant structural difference comes from the way in which technology is acquired: emulation and learning-by-doing in newly industrializing East Asia; research and development in the already industrialized G-7. The assumptions on structure for the usual studies of technological change are appropriate for the latter but not the former.
In the next section, we present a model with induced localized technical change that would yield one structure for the aggregate economy. We show through an example that technical change can exist yet be missed by the conventional measures of TFP growth. From the intuition of the example, we introduce a more general framework and derive testable implications. In section 3, we present empirical evidence that supports the story of induced localized technical progress. Section 4 concludes.
Induced Localized Technical Change and TFP

Growth
The possibility of structural change and technical gains in the East Asian countries was suggested by Van and Wan (1997) and Nelson and Pack (1999) . The difference between the two explanations was in the factor driving the structural change. Van and Wan suggested that it is the complementarity between human and physical capital. Growth in human capital allows more capital intensive industries to spawn. Nelson and Pack emphasized the role of entrepreneurship in driving the transition to the new industries. In this paper, we argue that of learning-by-doing may be important where the initial "doing" is induced by relative factor prices influenced by deliberate policy or exogenous macroeconomic factors. We start with an example below and follow with a more general representation.
An Example
Suppose there are three potential industries in the economy, indexed by i = 1, 2, 3.
Output in each industry is produced with capital and labor using a Leontief technology, 
Index the industries by increasing capital intensity,
Within each industry, the productivity term, A i t assumes a low value, A iL , when it is a "new" industry, and a high value, A iH , when it is a "mature"
industry. The industry becomes more productive through learning-by-doing. For simplicity, assume a new industry matures after one period of operation.
Consider the situation where industry 1 is already "mature" at time , that is, for A 1 t+s = A 1H . Industries 2 and 3 are "new" industries, or that gains in efficiency can still be achieved in these industries. These assumptions follow from the observation that economies' specializations go from more labor-intensive to more capital-intensive industries over time.
Aggregate output and capital per capita can written as follows:
Aggregate per capita output and capital are weighted averages of the respective industry values with the weights being the fraction of the labor force employed in
The economy's specialization pattern depends on the relative price of inputs.
In Figure 1 , the right-angled unit-value isoquants for each of the three industries are drawn in the K-L plane. If the factor price ratio, w/r, were less than θ as drawn, then the economy would specialize in industry 1. If the factor price ratio were exactly, θ, both industries 1 and 2 would be producing. For a factor price ratio slightly greater than θ, only industry 2 would produce. The convex hull of the three industry-level unit-value isoquants form the "unit-value contour" for the aggregate economy.
Now suppose that at time t − 1 the market price ratio were slightly less than as drawn in figure 1 so that the economy currently specializes in industry 1. At time t, the government begins a program to subsidize lending rates, lowering r.
Under the subsidized capital rental rate, the factor price ratio is now exactly θ. As a result, capital and labor begin to shift from industry 1 to industry 2. 2 At time t
This is shown as point A in Figure   1 .
In period t + 1, after a period of learning-by-doing, efficiency gains are achieved in industry 2, so now
Having mastered the technology specific to industry 2, the economy could now target industry 3 in the same manner as before. The economy moves to point B in Figure 1 .
In the conventional growth accounting exercise, it is usually assumed that there exists an underlying continuous production function describing the aggregate economy. Given the observed points A and B, a candidate aggregate production, F(K, L, t), might be one represented by its dual unit-value isoquant aa in Figure 1 . Note that under the assumed structure of F(K, L, t), the economy's evolution from point A to point B would be interpreted as pure capital deepening, no technological gain. This of course overlooks the productivity gain in industry 2 described above.
Elasticities of Substitution and Localized Technical Gains
The idea of localized technical gains described in the above example was discussed by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969) . Each industry in the economy is indexed by its capital intensity and the aggregate production function can be thought of as an envelope of the best practice in each industry in the economy. We can apply this representation to the more general case with many industries. This is shown in Figure 2 .
Over time, it is observed that the economy moves from point A to B to C. The unit-value isoquant aa that is the dual of a typical aggregate production function will fit these observed points. Thus the evolution of the economy from A to B to C is interpreted as capital deepening with no technical gain. In reality, the points A, B and C are actually convex combinations of the "mature" industry of lower capital intensity and a "new" industry of higher capital intensity. The movement from A to B, for instance, is actually due to a combination of the technical gains specific to the more capital intensive industry, the disappearance of the less capital intensive industry, and the investment made in the next "new" industry which is of even higher capital intensity. The technical gain as an industry matures (from learning by doing in our example) is missed when aa is thought to represent the production frontier.
The problem is one of misidentification noted by Diamond, McFadden, and Rodriguez (1978) . Given a series of observations, it is not possible to uniquely identify both the elasticity of substitution and the bias of technical change of the underlying production function. The most notable studies that attempt to measure technical change in the East Asian countries typically assume a
Cobb-Douglass production function (elasticity equal to one) and Hicks-neutral technical change. Although this structure may have appeared to fit the data, it may have been an alternative structure and dynamic that generated the observations.
In our example of learning-by-doing technical change induced by factor prices, the unit-value contour moves from aATo to aBT'o to aCo, and the technical change is best represented as labor-saving, not Hicks-neutral. If the unit-value isoquant aa comes from the assumption of a Cobb-Douglass production function, then the true elasticity of substitution consistent with our example will be less than one. Suppose that production is represented by a general production
and A K and A L are capital-augmenting and labor-augmenting productivity factors, respectively. The change in the capital share is given by the expression:
where α is the capital share, σ is the elasticity of substitution, and hats over variables denote rates of change. If the assumption of the Cobb-Douglass form is able to fit the observed data in our example shown in Figure 2 , thenα = 0. Our example is a case where the capital-labor ratio is increasing over time, (K −L > 0), and where the aggregate technical gain is best represented as labor-saving,
. It is possible that the two changes completely offset so that an elasticity of less than one is still consistent with a constant capital share.
The mis-identification of the underlying production function is still possible even for more general form of the production function is allowed. For instance, Kim and Lau (1994) estimate a general translog production function to find little or no technical change in the East Asian countries, an increase in the capital-labor ratio and a falling capital share over time. From equation (1), this is consistent with an elasticity of substitution less than one. In Figure 2 , suppose the unit-value isoquant aa comes from a general form of the production function like the translog form. This could still miss the localized technical change. For the unit-value contours (aATo, aBT'o, and aCo) that are drawn for our induced localized-technical-gain example, the elasticity of substitution would be less than the elasticity of substitution implied by the unit-value isoquant aa. With factor prices, we can calculate the empirical elasticity of substitution, d log(K/L)/d log(w/r) to see how it compares to the elasticity of substitution implied from the estimated production function.
A second empirical implication can also be seen from Figure 2 . At each of the points A, B, and C, the factor price ratio, w/r is equal to the marginal rate of technical substitution, MRT S, under the induced localized-technical-progress example. This is greater than the MRT S implied from the production function underlying isoquant aa.
Finally, a crucial feature of our hypothesis is that the most capital-intensive sectors will be the ones experiencing the highest TFP growth in any period. If we allow for technology-upgrading within sectors, the more generalized interpretation would be that the most capital-intensive production units experience the highest TFP growth. We present evidence on these three empirical implications in the next section.
Supporting Evidence
Evidence on the Elasticity of Substitution
The following inequality is consistent with our example of localized technical
The left-hand-side is the empirical elasticity of substitution while the right-hand-side is the elasticity of substitution implied from the production function estimated or assumed in previous studies of productivity growth in the East Asian countries. The MRT S is equal to the ratio of the marginal product of labor to that of capital, MPL/MPK. When a Cobb-Douglass form is assumed for the production function as in, for example, the studies by Collins and Bosworth (1996) and Young (1994) the right-hand-side of inequality (2) is exactly unity.
When a more general form for the production function is assumed, as in Kim and Lau (1994) , the implied elasticity of substitution can be less than, equal to, or greater than one.
We calculate the true elasticities of substitution for Korea, Singapore and Taiwan and check to see of these values are below unity . We also compare to the elasticities of substation implied by the translog production function estimated in Kim and Lau (1994) .
Capital stock is constructed using the investment series from the gross domestic fixed capital formation (GFCF) data countries' national accounts. The GFCF data are divided into five categories: residential buildings, non-residential buildings, other construction, transport equipment, and machinery equipment. A capital stock is calculated for each category and is then aggregated. The capital stock is calculated using the standard perpetual inventory approach with geometric depreciation where the initial capital stock series is initialized by assuming that the growth rate of investment in the first five years of the national accounts investment series is representative of the growth of investment prior to the beginning of the series. The initial capital stock is thus calculated by the formula K(0) = I(0)/(g + δ), where I(0) is the first year of the investment data series, g is the average growth of investment in assets in the first five years of the investment series, and δ is the depreciation rate for the asset. We use depreciation rates by asset category and the growth rate of investment in the first five years of GFCF data.
For labor inputs, we use the working population, classified by industry and hour of work. Multiplying all employees of the nonagricultural sector by average weekly (or monthly) hours of work gives a total labor amount.
For the real wage, w, we use average weekly (or monthly) earnings of nonagricultural employees for each country. The aggregate capital rental price is an average of the rental price of five categories of capital goods: residential building, non-residential building, other construction, transport equipment, and machinery equipment. Assuming firms have perfect foresight and capital follows geometric depreciation, the real rental price of investment good j, r j , can be calculated as
wherep K j is the growth rate of the price of investment good j, i the nominal interest rate, δ j the rate of physical depreciation, and P Y is the GDP deflator (see Jorgenson (1963) The results are shown in Figures 3, 4 and 5 in a plot of the empirical against the implied elasticities of substitution in Kim and Lau (1994) in each year. First, note that the true elasticity of substitution is less than unity for each country in almost every year. This supports the localized technical gain story over the results found when a Cobb-Douglass form of production is assumed. Note also that the elasticities of substitution implied by the translog estimates of Kim and Lau (1994) are also less than unity for each country in almost every year. This is consistent with their finding of a falling capital share, no technical gain and capital deepening. Second, note that the points are below the 45 line in most years for each country or that inequality (2) holds in almost every year. This also supports for the localized technical gains story over the finding of no technical gains when the more translog production function is allowed as in Kim and Lau (1994) . 
Evidence of Induced Technical Gains
Another implication of the induced localized technical gain story is the following inequality:
Again, we calculate the from the parameter estimates for the translog production function in Kim and Lau (1994) . Industries, the so-called HCI program (see Stern, Kim, Perkins, and Yoo (1995) ).
Under this program, which ended in 1979, big subsidies were channeled to the HCI sectors, many in the form of lower interest rates. These targeted industries grew much faster than the manufacturing average in the 1970s. There was a brief slow-down during the recession of the early 1980s, but from 1979 to 1988, all the HCI sectors with the exception of industrial chemicals grew faster than the average for all manufacturing; the biggest standout is Huyndai Shipping, which has become one of the world's major producers. The other period of interest is the late 1980s marked by the end of a policy of labor repression (see Kim (1997) ). The sharp increase in labor costs that followed again shifted production to a number of more capital-and skill-intensive industries. The late 1980s and into the 1990s saw a big surge in Korean exports to the U.S. of motor vehicles and parts, semiconductors, and electronic computing equipment.
4
The same plot of the ratio (w/r)/MRT S for Taiwan is shown in Figure 8 .
Here, there are two periods where the ratio is noticeably greater than one. During the mid to late 1970s the government undertook the "Ten Major Projects:" six in transportation, three heavy industry, and one nuclear power generation project (see Kuo (1999) ). These big public investments were in part a Keynesian policy response to the recession coming from the 1970s oil shocks. The investments though, diverted resources to and induced production in key industries. The second period was the mid to late 1980s. This coincided with government's direct response to the massive capital inflow into Taiwan between 1985-87 when foreign exchange reserves increased by US$ 51 billion and caused an appreciation of 40% of the Taiwan dollar against the U.S. dollar. To prevent even further appreciation, and the accompanying adverse effects on exports and import-competing industries, interest rates were significantly reduced during this period. There was a big surge in the exports of the apparel and metal industries during 1978-79.
Starting in 1986 there was a boom in electronics exports and in semiconductors starting in 1994.
All the events described above were results of major government initiatives, some proactively promoting certain industries while others as a reaction to some external shock. All had profound macro effects on factor prices and induced technical progress in important industries.
Evidence from Plant-Level TFP Growth in Korea
One implication of the framework we propose in section 2 illustrated in Figure 2 is that the most capital-intensive sectors will experience the highest TFP growth in any period. This is one characterization. An alternative interpretation of is that each industry could itself be changing to more capital-intensive technologies.
Therefore, a more general interpretation of our framework is that the most capital-intensive plants would be experiencing the highest TFP growth in any period.
In this section, we use plant-level data from four Korean Industrial Censuses (KIC) : 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998 to calculate TFP growth for groupings of plants by capital intensity. The KIC is conducted by the Korean National Statistical Office (NSO) every five years and contains basic information about plant activities such as the value of production, value of export, the number of workers, payments for workers including pension and fringe benefits, the book value of tangible fixed assets (land, buildings, machinery, tools and furniture, and transportation equipment), production costs such as expenditures on raw material, fuel, subcontracting, and services purchased, as well as the year of foundation and plant identification number. We only consider plants with 5 or more workers. We also drop plants in the tobacco and recycling industries. This leaves a total of 38,971 plants in 1983, 59,616 in 1988, 88,601 in 1993 and 79,102 in 1998. To calculate a TFP index from this disaggregated data we use the index introduced by Caves, Christensen, and Diewart (1982) to take into consideration each individual plant's contribution to the aggregate technological progress. TFP index for plant p in year t is written as:
where plant p produces a single output Y pt with the set of inputs, X ipt , where i = We group the plants into five and ten groups of increasing capital intensity.
Each group's TFP index is then defined as the market-share weighted sum of each plant's TFP, ln T FP t = p ω pt ln T FP pt , where ω pt is plant p's share in total output in year t. The growth rate of TFP is calculated as The same pattern emerges when we consider ten groupings of plants by capital intensity. Figure 10 plots TFP growth for the 10 groups of plants. Again, TFP growth is highest for the 10th percentile group: over 6% between 1983 and 1988; just under 10% between 1988 and 1993; and 9% between 1993 and 1998 .
The results consistently show that the biggest technical gains occur in the most capital-intensive plants. This is consistent with our description of localized technical gains in more capital-intensive production.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we suggest that the East Asian growth experience involved successive technological gains achieved in specific sectors through learning by doing. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that structural change was induced by policy or macroeconomic factors. Our results are interesting in that we were able to use the methodology introduced in this paper to identify meaningful technological gains where the conventional aggregate growth accounting exercise did not. 
